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1. Introduction to the case 
This case study deals with the development of the management process for the implementation 
of Structural Funds in four Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries (Poland, Slovakia, 
Romania and Hungary)1, and focus on one Hungarian region’s (Southern Transdanubia) Regional 
Operational Programme planning and implementation process.  
From a research point of view, the relevant policy areas are European Cohesion Policy and the 
process of strategic planning directed at the access to Structural Funds (SF) money. We will 
analyse the context of these policy areas and territorial governance, and the impacts that they 
have on each other.  
The aims of Cohesion Policy fit into the expected development objectives of Europe 2020 with 
the main objective to decrease regional disparities. One potential instrument of this policy 
objective could be the making and acceptance and implantation of “bottom-up” regional plans 
(with involvement of regional stakeholders). Another way could be the creation of regionally 
sensitive National Strategic Reference Frameworks (NSRFs), and there may be a combination of 
both. We will also examine the Regional Operational Programmes’ (ROP) embedded position in 
the investigated countries’ national plans, and its connections to the sectorial Operational 
Programmes (OPs). 
Structural Funds (SF) have a significant impact on public administration, especially in CEE 
countries, where the absorption of the EU subsidies is one of the most important policy and 
political ambitions. However, the governance regime of SF is a considerable challenge, since 
traditional government structures and practices in CEE countries do not typically harmonise 
with the principles of subsidiarity, decentralisation, regionalism, partnership, efficiency, 
transparency and strategic, integrated planning. Therefore, CEE countries have tried to adapt to 
these challenges in different ways. They do so institutionally by implementing internal structural 
reforms of public administration (learning) and/or by establishing separate, “unfamiliar” 
structures and institutions to better fit to the SF system (imitating). Further, there are functional 
changes in the instrumental model and processes. The main question became: is it better to 
establish an internal institutional development process, and as a part of it, an integrated (into 
the national administration) and convenient (from the point of view the EU) institution. Or, was 
it better to build a new SF institution separated from the national governmental structure, 
where the SF institution fully fits with the European requirements. The investigated countries 
chose different solutions. The case study therefore deals with territorial public administration 
reforms of the selected countries and the SF management institution building process and its 
governance methods (multilevel, multi-actor).  
                                                          
1
The research of Visegrad countries supported by the BolyaiJános Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences. 
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While the European Union generally considers the structure and functioning of public 
administration as a national internal affair, it has established a fairly strong adaptation force 
through the rules of utilization of Structural Funds (Pálné Kovács, 2009). From the territorial 
governance perspective, it is an important question. Each Eastern European Member State (EU 
12) is characterized by the institutional pressure of EU Structural Funds which push the 
administrative reforms simultaneously with the SF management building. The Structural Fund’s 
relative importance is particularly high in the CEE countries, where the Structural Funds have 
virtually replaced the domestic development policy which determines the national 
contributions, the national development resources, and therefore significantly exceeds the 
volume of national development resources regulated by non-European Union rules. Therefore, 
the role of the SF is much more dominant in these cases than in the old Member States, and 
subsequently, it has the instruments to promote a multi-level and participative mode of 
governance in the new Member States. That is why the Structural Funds were able to influence 
to such a high degree the administrative reforms in CEE countries.  
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2. Integrating policy sectors 
Comparative analysis 
The degree of policy sectors integration depends on the (1) domestic management of regional 
development and the (2) institutional system built up for Structural Fund management.  
There are two main strategies applied in the CEE countries’ practices in connection with 
supporting the balanced development of the territory through domestic regional development 
management and implementation. In the first model (for example in Hungary and in Slovakia), 
the central administration of regional development is divided between two institutions a) a 
special regional development "sectoral institution" (Ministry), which is responsible for regional 
development tasks and b), a supra-ministerial institution, which is responsible for inter-sectoral 
coordination and for the horizontal enforcement of the territorial approach. In the second 
model (as we can see in Poland) there is a top Ministry which performs the management and 
planning of development policy as a whole, including the domestic regional and inter-sectoral 
development. These models vary through time and from country to country.  
From the point of view of the compliance of the Structural Funds institution to the domestic 
public administration system, two models can also be identified. In the integrated model the 
planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating institutions and procedures are not distinct 
from the domestic development institutions and procedures (PL). The separated model means 
that there are parallel Structural Fund and public administration institutions. This model 
depends on the degree of administrative integration (using existing administrative bodies), the 
integration of programming (the EU programmes are integrated partly to the domestic 
development policy implementation), and the financial integration (using funds according to the 
national accounting rules). It may imply therefore the appearance of a mixed model (HU) 
(Perger, 2009). 
The South Transdanubia Operational Programme (STOP) case 
2.1 Public policy packaging 
In Hungary, the priorities of sectoral ministries were dominant during the planning process in 
the programming periods. The other general finding is that sectoral interests were often 
overwritten by political interests, which was perceivable in the reorganization and mergers of 
ministries, forming of SF institutions, and in the involvement or omission of actors. These 
decisions were justified by neither sectoral nor regional interests.  
During the planning, serious conflict situations arose between sectoral ministries as they 
competed for the same finite resources. In addition to that, the unused resources given by the 
EU were likely to be lost due to the scarcity of national development resources that were 
needed to match EU funding. Forced sectoral cooperations and synergies were formed (i.e. 
there were integrated sectoral OPs, where the ministries were forced to think together). In 
general, however, it is true that regional interests were not represented in the development of 
NSRF and the Community Support Framework.  
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Inter-sector conflicts emerged during the implementation of the programme. The financing 
source of a project (by which OP the project could be financed) could become a debated issue 
as the aspiration in the course of planning was to prepare general OPs in which everything could 
be included later on (Interview B). 
Sectoral ministries also influenced the tendering phase. Tenders could be announced only by 
the approval of the affected Ministry. Initially, regional development agencies  as intermediate 
bodies were involved in calls for proposals and action plans but their functions had been 
gradually reduced since 2008 and terminated in 2011 (Interview B). Once again, the process 
became centralised and homogeneous. From the point of view the central SF management, the 
reasons for this were the homogeneous regional visions (which did not justify the seven 
different calls as they stated almost the same), and the questionable success of involved 
initiatives of the Regional Development Agency (i.e. making cooperation the basic condition) 
(Interviews D-E). The management situation of the ministry responsible for regional 
development did not help either to involve regionalization in the planning and implementation 
of NSRF.  
2.2 Cross-sector synergy 
A Government Commission for Development Policy was established in order to strengthen the 
governmental coordination of developmental policy during the preparation of NSRF. Its task was 
to coordinate the various national strategies. (It operated only until 2008.) In 2006, in order to 
represent local interests more effectively, a government advisory body responsible for regional 
development was formed as well. It was the National Development Council, whose members 
included experts, government actors and regional development agencies. However, neither of 
them was responsible for sectoral coordination. Thus, conflicts of sectoral interests emerged 
(strictly in terms of a relevant topic i.e. in terms of human resource development) mainly during 
the harmonization of OPs organized by the National Development Agency.  
The national strategy was prepared partly in a bottom-up manner, as the regions (Regional 
Development Agencies) had also made regional plans in advance but the regional efforts could 
not become stand-alone plans. Since 2007, there had been individual ROPs although they did 
not reflect true regional efforts since plans were structured from above, primarily under the 
direction of national sectoral ministries. So regional conceptions were often involved in sectoral 
OP, and only the remainders of priorities could be included in ROPs. Sectoral OPs were, 
however, characterized by local insensitivity (as it should have been the role of ROPs). Another 
planning mistake was that the strongly filtered ROPs of the seven NUTS2 regions were hardly 
distinguishable and contained no territorial specificities.  
The planning of South Transdanubia Operational Programme (STOP) also took place in a 
centralised scheme. The elaboration of STOP strictly followed the continuously changing 
requirements of the EU and the central governmental expectations (Pálné et al. 2009).The 
planning process of the STOP was launched at the end of 2004. Following the decision on the 
main targets, the planning team determined the so-called strategic development programmes 
which were elaborated for each major sector with the exception of rural development. Then the 
8 
 
National Development Agency gave priority frames for each ROP in which the prepared strategy 
had to be inserted. Some uniqueness and regional characteristics could be involved as well. In 
the case of STOP, the European Capital of Culture programme is a good example for this. ( 
European Cultural Capital programme  was involved due to the pressure from central 
government, though.) Interview B shows another example for projects with regional 
characteristics: the prioritization of brownfield investments, but it had less role and less 
emphasis within the STOP than the mentioned European Capital of Culture programme. 
 
Features of territorial governance 
Independent, strong and stable management of regional policy under central government 
enables the continuous representation of local interests and the involvement of local actors to a 
certain extent. If regional development appears as a strong sector then local interests may 
emerge during sectoral negotiations as well and there is no need for sectoral or political 
coordination. The Hungarian practice is characterized by the weakness of regional policy and its 
"migration" within the government structure.  
Whilst displaying regional interests and needs, the Regional Operational Programme 
theoretically guarantees the enforcement of regionality in the use of SF through the 
involvement of regional actors. This has only partially been realized in Hungary, as in the first 
programming period there were no ROPs and even though ROPs they were elaborated in the 
2007-2013 period, they did not contain effective regional specialities as they were constructed 
on the basis of the residual principle; i.e. that took up all of the “leftover” priorities. It is already 
foreseeable now that there will be no regional knowledge accumulation as an integrated ROP 
will be drafted again for the country from 2014.  
Collaborative Plans serve the common development of the regions. In the STOP case, this was 
clearly lacking. There were neither development policy strategic documents nor sectoral plans 
in many cases, so even though strategic plans were made by the beginning of planning phase, 
there was nothing they could have been adjusted to. Later on, sectors used them mainly for 
adopting good ideas in the sectoral OPs. 
Intersectoral coordinating body in the central government is able to integrate various sectoral 
conceptions and can think in terms of a single and complex developmental vision. This could be 
beneficial especially in some regions requiring complex development even if there is no 
separated regional development sectoral ministry. This kind of coordination in Hungary took 
form in the organization of the National Development Agency and in the framework of the 
debates surrounding OPs with a sectoral approach. Thus no complex thinking was fully realized.   
The coordination of national development policy integrates visions, efforts of various sectors, 
sectoral interests and different sectoral and regional actors in a single framework and uses 
consultation forums on different levels where local actors are represented. During the 
preparation of the Hungarian NSRF, different institutes and bodies were  formulated; however, 
the coordination efficiency was reduced by the continuous structural and personnel changes as 
well as the political influence of some institutes and its leaders. In addition, at the beginning of 
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the NSRF preparation, when strategic decisions had to be made (i.e. OP structure) and national 
strategic development documents had not yet been adopted, EU rules and requirements were 
much more influential than the domestic complex development ideas.  
 
3. Coordinating actions of actors and institutions  
Comparative analysis 
The centralisation to a large extent determines the coordination mechanisms between the 
stakeholders and institutions. Therefore, we should analyse the centralised and the 
decentralised public administration bodies’ roles in programming and implementation. In the 
decentralised model such as we see in Poland, the regional actors have an important role in the 
process of planning, programming and implementing ROPs. They make decisions about the 
allocation of the ROPs. In contrast, in the classical form of the centralised model, administration 
bodies of the central state are responsible for planning, implementing and managing the whole 
SF program, including the ROPs, as seen in Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. Even though these 
central bodies can involve regional partners in the planning process, it still remains primarily 
central, and the managing authorities are also centralised (Perger, 2009). 
 
The STOP case 
3.1 Governing capacity 
Regional Development Councils and Regional Development Agencies had a negligible role in the 
allocation process of the national development resources from the beginning (1996) to 2008. 
This negligible role originated from the limited amount of decentralised domestic regional 
development funds. For the programming period 2007-2013 the steering competencies of the 
NSRF and the OPs have been concentrated in one single mega-organisation, namely the 
National Development Agency, which has resulted in the regions’ secondary role in the planning 
and implementation (Pálné et al., 2009). The National Development Agency conducted the bi- or 
multi-lateral consultations, working group discussions, where Regional Development Agencies 
were usually also invited. The seven Regional Development Agencies generally arrived at a prior 
agreement and represented a common standpoint during these occasions. ROP Managing 
Authority represented the common territorial interests during the central and sectoral 
reconciliations. Certain programs were passed on to ROPs, yet on the basis of the experiences of 
the previous programming period (Integrated Regional Operational Programme), the Managing 
Authority  strived to integrate “good, achievable programs” as well (Interviews D-E). During the 
negotiations with sectoral ministries, the presence of powerful local politicians meant an 
advantage, so even if sectoral ministries were not willing to satisfy the demands of Managing 
Authorities of ROPs, regional interests could still be enforced by the regional political actors 
(Interview B). 
In the planning process of the STOP Pálné Kovács and Varjú (2009) identified the dominance of 
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the steering, institutional knowledge. They have found that planners of the National 
Development Agency and the Regional Development Agency were able to acquire a dominant 
role because they were familiar with the procedural, organisational and institutional 
requirement system, the specific terminology of European planning, the logic of reconciliation 
mechanisms and the competencies of the different tiers. Commonly used phrases were 
“Brussels expects that…” “European knowledge”, i.e. being familiar with the “functioning of the 
EU” in Hungary at that time was the privilege of a narrow group of expert elite. A peculiar 
paradox is that the staff of the National Development Agency had a relatively poor institutional 
and steering knowledge of its own institution. The unstable organisational context concerning 
its new, fairly complicated internal regulation reduced the performance of the staff working 
there. The employees were new and young technocrats with relatively poor knowledge on 
public administration and the organisation itself, which caused some coordination problems. 
3.2 Leadership 
A peculiar form of coordination appeared with the fact that Regional Development Agencies, 
which were mobilised as intermediate bodies, were in a relationship of subordination with 
Regional Development Councils (founders, owners, continuous working relationship), even 
though no contractual relationship existed between the Councils and the National Development 
Agency (Interview B). Councils have been excluded from the processes since 2008. A specific 
problem in coordination was eliminated, however, which was caused by the unclear division of 
labour (parallel activities, unregulated situations) between the regional network of the 
cooperating organisations of the integrated ROP during the 2004-2006 programming period. 
From 2007, the same two organisations were involved in the form of Intermediate Bodies, yet 
this time their competencies were defined along the handling of priorities. Uncertainties did 
appear in the beginning, especially since Regional Development Agency was charged with 
regional planning and the preparation of tenders even in the case of priorities which did not 
belong to the RDA. From 2008 onwards, centralisation within the Regional Development Agency 
resolved this problem (Interviews D-E). The problem in coordination was a result of the action of 
decision-makers in this case, since the involvement of the two Intermediate Bodies was not 
justifiable from the viewpoint of capacities, Regional Development Agency alone would have 
been capable of handling this task (Interview B). 
The ROP Managing Authority had its own internal procedures, and thus the involved 
intermediate bodies had other means to establish relationships with the applicants as in the 
case of other constructions. This relationship was also regulated by the Intermediate Bodies’ 
contracts. During the phase of planning, the Managing Authority handed concrete templates 
concerning the structure of the OP to the Regional Development Agency. Until 2010, the 
Managing Authority and the Regional Development Agency had been in a direct relationship 
with each other. However, from 2011 onwards, even the relationships became centralised 
(where regional demands had to be to channelled to the National Development Agency centre). 
Initially, the various Intermediate Bodies had disposed of different contact persons within the 
various Managing Authorities, thus it could occur that Intermediate Bodies and applicants 
received different information about the same question. There were attempts to apply common 
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standpoints in the case of certain general questions, yet their wide dissemination to the public 
was not achieved (e.g. on a webpage) (Interviews B, E-D). 
The coordination competence of the Regional Development Agency was a result of a political 
decision, therefore it was accepted by every stakeholder. In a similar way, the designation of 
Intermediate Bodies was also a result of political decision-making, during which local networks 
and experiences of the previous programming period played an important role in the case of 
ROPs. The National Development Agency enforced its ideas through its standpoints, regulations, 
control and supervision of the leaders of the Intermediate Bodies. The management system was 
transformed during the programming period as well, the governmental change brought about 
radical transformations (designation of new Intermediate Bodies, centralisation, etc.). 
3.3 Subsidiarity 
A continuous system of feedback served as the basis of the implemented changes in 
management and coordination. External expert opinions were prepared, internal institutional 
investigations were performed, opinions were handed in by Intermediate Bodies and applicants, 
and each tender was submitted to public debate (Interviews B, D-E). On this basis, there was a 
continuous modification of procedural orders, the practice of communication, the methods of 
implementation, authorization and control, the tenders, and practically the entire operation of 
coordination. This resulted in permanent centralisation, and during the governmental change at 
the turn of 2010/2011, a radical institutional transformation occurred which involved the 
appointment of new Intermediate Bodies, institutional leaders and changing competencies. 
The evaluation of the NSRF was also terminated. There was an attempt to incorporate the 
statements of the ex-ante evaluation into the plan. During this period, a mid-term evaluation 
was also prepared (KPMG, 2011) without any direct impacts since the governmental change 
interfered, and Brussels had granted permission to the transfer of resources between OPs prior 
to the publication of the report. 
New changes have occurred since 2012 with the abolition of Regional Development Councils, 
county governments remained the only spatial development and spatial planning actors which 
had accumulated practice in the process of regional development strategy-making as partners, 
but not as coordinators. Self-governments lost several of their functions which were transferred 
to the county-level state decentralised administration. Furthermore, the Regional Development 
Agencies, as Structural Fund and regional development institutional actors, have also become 
centralised organs, as they were transferred from the Regional Development Council’s control 
to the ministry responsible for regional development. The centralised control of regional 
development agencies limits their functions directed at project generation and assisting and 
improving the position of local citizens, which has a highly negative impact on the quality of 
tenders. In addition, there is no regional stakeholder which would be able to fulfil their previous 
function.   
Features of territorial governance 
The coordination experience of the European funds may result in the accumulation of 
knowledge within an institution or organisational unit which is indispensable for successful 
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coordination. The Hungarian practice demonstrates that since the transmission of such 
experiences did not always occur (it was rather the professionals and the employees migrating 
from one institution to the other who preserved and brought those experiences with them), the 
advantages inherent in that system could not be exploited to the fullest extent. The South 
Transdanubian Regional Development Agency constituted a positive exception from this aspect, 
since the conservation and continuous development of the staff were regarded as a priority.   
The changing central government impacts the institutional system and the staff, which may 
hinder knowledge accumulation, cause uncertainty and threaten permanent functioning. In the 
case of Hungary, the governmental change fundamentally transformed the institutional system 
and its functioning. This included the way in which resources were allocated, the  circle of 
stakeholders involved, it contributed to centralisation, thus producing a multiplied negative 
impact despite the fact that some of its impacts led to enhanced efficiency.  
Authorisation in itself is not sufficient to guarantee the effective scope of action - financial 
autonomy is also required. The global financial crisis proved that a considerable amount of 
external funds (EU support) and the conditions they implied (e.g. pressure towards integration 
or centralization) opposed the functioning of territorial governance. In Hungary, financial 
dependence (from EU funds) characterizes the central government - which has no proper 
development resources - just as much as the local and county self-governments. There has been 
a minimal flow of resources from ROPs towards the real sphere, and most often they served to 
finance the unproductive developments of municipalities. In addition, local self-governments 
have no longer any scope for autonomous development, and they have been deprived of the 
bulk of their previous tasks and resources, which has decreased their financial autonomy 
further. 
Experiences in partnership-making may contribute to the involvement of territorial stakeholders 
in the processes. Hungarian experiences in these domains are lacking, therefore deficiencies in 
partnership-building were observed during the preparation and implementation of the NSRF. 
The participation of local politicians may contribute to the enforcement of local interests and 
their direct representation towards central decision-making stakeholders (in the case of 
parliamentary representation). In the STOP case, local politicians were evidently those who 
channelled the local-regional interests, albeit in an ad-hoc manner. 
The Structural Fund institutional system was characterized by the process of centralization and 
recentralization. The centralization itself and the operation of the state controlled institutional 
system reduced the flexibility of the system and it is in contradiction to the principle of 
subsidiarity.  
 
4. Mobilising stakeholder participation  
Comparative analysis 
In the design of the financial and operational framework of Cohesion Policy, the importance of 
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the partnership principle has increased and includes civil society organisations. They are also 
defined in the White Book on European Governance: trade unions and employers’ 
organisations; non-governmental organisations; professional associations; charities; grass-roots 
organisations; organisations that involve citizens in local and municipal life with a particular 
contribution from churches and religious communities. In this respect, the partnership principle 
highlights aspects of both vertical and horizontal integration. Cooperation between such actors 
can be realized through vertical and horizontal networks and involves the state, but also civil 
society at the local, regional, national and global levels (EP, 2008a; Oriniaková, 2008).  
The partnership principle is a general requirement of the EU towards all of the institutional 
bodies of the SF management system, during the whole implementation process. However, it 
was a great challenge, due to the CEE countries’ traditional, bureaucratic state administration 
system and their limited experiences in the area of partnership, which needs a new form of 
management. There are two forms of involvement of stakeholders into the SF allocation 
process. First, they are members of Monitoring Committees, and they monitor the 
implementation of SF money. Second, they can comment on and create the sectoral and 
regional programs of NSRFs.  According to a European Parliamentary Report on several EU 
member states (2008a-b), it was common that the biggest umbrella organisations were able to 
exploit the opportunity of the SF consultation process. The involvement of smaller NGOs poses 
some technical problems when it comes to expanding the civil society partnerships in Cohesion 
Policy. Local or ad-hoc NGOs often lack the resources in terms of personnel and infrastructure 
to analyse and process documentation, and even to have a continuity of representation in the 
instances where they participate (different voluntary representatives attending meetings). 
 
The STOP case 
4.1 Democratic legitimacy 
In Hungary, neither traditions nor national rules for partnership-building existed, and the civil 
sphere was not able to realize self-organizing and bottom-up organizations. Civil society had the 
pretext that the centre authorities had selected the partners for itself so the more active and 
less “disciplined” civil organisations were excluded. The opportunity for partnership building 
resulted in a competitive situation in the civil sphere, where the civil organizations used this 
new situation to consolidate their position. The members of the SF institutional system were 
looking for partners whose involvement would match the EU’s requirements. From the point of 
view of SF institutions, partnership building was a compulsory extra task; they just wanted to 
imitate its performance. The other aspect of partnership requirements was interest 
reconciliation with the NGO partners during the programming period (Perger, 2009).  
In Hungary, the professional groups and civil society in many cases were only involved in a 
formal way in the program’s public consultation. This meant that some proposals were not or 
were only partially incorporated into the planning process (KPMG 2011). Smaller civil 
organisations did not dispose of sufficient capacities enabling them to participate in the 
processes. 
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4.2 Public accountability 
The tools of the public information were websites, conciliation boards questionnaires, strategic 
background surveys and formal/informal, thematic and regional working groups (Molnárné 
Hegymegi, 2009). Formal legitimacy was provided during the preparation and implementation 
of the NSRF. This was guaranteed by the National Development Agency through the obligatory 
procedures of publicity provision, societal consultation, assessment and the inclusion of 
partners (e.g. Monitoring Committees). 
The social discussion of the NSRF was a two-month procedure, involving almost four hundred 
organizations. The National Development Agency sent letters or e-mails to the partner 
organisations registered during the former conciliation process or found in the ministerial 
databases. Nevertheless, the participants complained about the one-way communication: in the 
majority of the forums the intentions of the Government were introduced and the debate was 
restricted to why the recommendations could not be accepted (Pálné et al., 2009). During the 
programming period the stakeholders characteristically were able to deliver their own opinions 
by web-expression. The National Development Agency started its own portal with an internet 
platform for web-expressions in connection with 14 OPs (from the 15). 1350 NGOs reflected the 
OPs (Molnárné Hegymegi, 2009). However, the time devoted to requesting comments was too 
short and bureaucrats had to observe too many regulations which prevented stakeholders from 
feeling its real effects. Smaller modifications were achieved. 
4.3 The procedure of STOP elaboration   
The Regional Working Group (set up by the law) of the region had 47 members, but there were 
no civil actors among the members; their role was merely consultative. The regional planning 
network was built up of representatives of micro-regions (with elected representatives), cities of 
county rank (with elected representatives) and county spatial development councils (with 
delegated representatives). The Regional Development Councils established a cooperation 
agreement with micro-regions (settlement communities) as well. The Professional Planners’ 
Network has 7 professional, sectoral Working Groups where experts were also invited. The 
plans commissioned by the Regional Development Councils and subject to the reconciliations 
and debates were prepared by planning consortiums. The planning network was open, yet no 
one applied for membership (Interview B), members entered through invitation, who were 
highly active, since a kind of anticipation was experienced from the side of the stakeholders as 
well. There were certain members who were absent from the sessions because during 
ministerial reconciliations complete sectors were removed from the ROP (Interview A). This was 
the case with the agricultural and the higher educational sector. 
The stakeholders had varying opportunities to participate in the negotiations, previous 
cooperation experiences with the Regional Development Agency, Regional Development 
Council meant an advantage, yet there were certain groups which were excluded from the 
negotiation, since the involvement of stakeholders was not functioning properly, only in an ad 
hoc manner (Interview F). While the entire NSRF is characterised by the imitation of partnership 
building, ROPs were evidently the most successful in this area since it was here the widest circle 
15 
 
of stakeholders could be involved. During the preparation of the STOP, 90 conciliation forums 
and 30 micro-regional workshops were organised, which contributed to the involvement of 
almost 2500 stakeholders (STOP 2007). 
Economic actors were almost completely absent in the planning process of the STOP but to 
some extent traceable (Pálné et al., 2009). Instead, various entrepreneurial organisations were 
responsible for interest representation, individual enterprises were absent during the 
reconciliations. One of the interviewees (F) reported that the involvement of economic actors in 
the planning process was rather poor, and it was indicated that the calls for tenders and project 
evaluation demonstrated hostility towards entrepreneurs. Undoubtedly, the STOP concentrated 
community type developments and paid less attention to project opportunities for the private 
sector. 
Certain social layers or groups were prominently absent in the STOP (e.g. gipsies, women, 
homeless or elderly), and without interest representation they were unable to enforce their 
own aspects in the disputes (Pálné et al., 2009). In the meantime, the structure of the STOP, the 
planned development orientations did not reach these groups adequately (Interview B), 
therefore besides the absence of civil interest representatives, a lack of information and interest 
could equally be detected. 
 
Features of territorial governance 
Previous cooperation experiences of stakeholders determine to what degree they are willing to 
participate in the partnership. If they are convinced that they can exert an influence and 
powerfully represent their interests, then wider circles can be mobilized and be transformed 
into active stakeholders. Regional stakeholders’ good cooperation experiences were lacking in 
the STOP case, yet a certain enthusiasm was present which could be detected in the increased 
activity of the stakeholders of the planning process. The mobilization and formal involvement of 
stakeholders in the case of ROPs was the most successful and least imitated in relation to the 
Hungarian NSRF. The list of partners compiled during long years of the work organization of the 
Regional Development Council, the Regional Development Agency, provided an adequate basis 
for the organization of regional forums and included by and large the most significant regional 
stakeholders. However no stakeholders were involved who had had no previous relationships 
with the Regional Development Councils or the Regional Development Agency. New voices did 
not appear in regional development ideas in this sense. 
Guaranteeing the flow of information, the operation of adequate and wide-ranging information 
channels is a precondition for the accession and potential mobilization of stakeholders. In the 
case of the STOP, several organizations were excluded from the conciliation processes and the 
invitation of comments due to a lack of information; there was a lack of time for processing the 
mass of information, language skills and professional knowledge required for the interpretation 
of regulations and the various planning documents were often lacking on the side of the 
stakeholders. On the other hand, a mass of information channels and tools reaching a wide 
public were also mobilized in order to facilitate the communication of the NSRF. 
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 The level of the organization of civil life determines the opportunities of partnership-building. 
Where private stakeholders do not cooperate in order to enforce their own interests, partners 
have to be detected in a multi-stakeholder set where each actor has different interests. Where a 
large number of civil organizations are formed, the identification of interest groups and 
interests is easier and their involvement encounters fewer obstacles. The building of 
partnerships is harder in non-participatory type countries, such as CEE countries. The 
organization of civil life was weak in Hungary during the beginning of the examined period, 
therefore, the involvement of civil society occurred in a highly formalised manner, along forced 
paths.  
5. Being adaptive to changing contexts  
Learning process 
The problem of political elections and the impacts of the continual (often abrupt) changes to 
public administrative systems have to be investigated as important processes that dictate how 
governance competencies are developed for SF implementation management. These had an 
impact on the functioning of the entire institutional system, internal and external relations and 
communication of regional policy and SF management. For example, in Hungary, continuous 
personal and institutional changes at the sectoral ministries, in addition to the unclear division 
of labour between them, inhibited the development of bureaucratic automatisms, despite the 
existence of unchanged inter-sectoral institutions, such as National Development Agency 
(KPMG, 2011). The changing intermediate bodies caused problems in communication with 
stakeholders and beneficiaries. The same effect of erratic communication was caused by 
fluctuation in staff in the SF management organizations. The latter can hinder the accumulation 
of organizational knowledge, even in a centralized system, such as the Hungarian one. The 
impacts of the governmental change resulted in a disruption between sectoral portfolios and 
the National Development Agency precisely in 2010, when they should have collaborated at the 
level of strategic planning (preparation for the new programming period, rethinking the rules of 
the spending money in light of the financial crisis and the midterm evaluation reports).  
The managing organization of the SF, the National Development Agency’s young technocrats did 
not always possess experiences and accumulated knowledge, nor did the new organization have 
its own identity as National Development Agency, and yet the coordinative function was taken 
away from ministries, the majority of which had acquired institutional knowledge and 
traditions. While personal and institutional learning generally encountered obstacles due to the 
fluctuation of the staff and the cooperating and implementing bodies, positive processes did 
occur in this respect. For instance, experience showed that the movement of persons with 
adequate knowledge accompanied the institutional changes within the institutional system; 
their migration went hand in hand with the redistribution of tasks. The enhancement of 
knowledge accumulation was facilitated within the National Development Agency through 
continuous feedback, the involvement of external advisors, evaluations, handbooks, guidelines, 
standpoints, reorganizations (specialization), but due to an overburdened staff, this could not 
be exploited to the fullest. However, in the case of certain mechanisms, procedures and 
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repeated tasks, institutional learning was apparent.  
The utilization of regional knowledge was made possible through the involvement of Regional 
Development Agencies in the planning and implementation process which had accumulated 
knowledge on the basis of their previous experiences. By now, Regional Development Agencies 
dispose of such great institutional knowledge (as intermediate bodies of the second period) that 
no matter if ROPs are abolished from 2013 onwards, the present centrally controlled agencies 
(with their regional knowledge, partners and networks) subordinated to the Ministry 
responsible for development will likely be involved in the form of Intermediate Bodies. The 
“employment” of other regional stakeholders disposing of sectoral knowledge or knowledge 
about spatial development was basically absent in the 2007-13 period.  
The knowledge accumulation of stakeholders involved in the absorption of Structural Funds and 
planning must also be mentioned. A wide circle of regional stakeholders acquired knowledge in 
the preparation of projects; counselling and project writing companies were established which 
“filter” the tenders in advance in order to select those which are worth dealing with, and they 
generate tenders which would be impossible within the institutional system. The knowledge of 
their region, their system of relationships, their local knowledge and often even the reputation 
of stakeholders involved in the reconciliation of plans showed an increase, their participation at 
the forums permitted them to continuously access new information.    
 
Risk-taking, experimentation 
The interviewees expressed different opinions about risk taking possibilities and 
experimentation during the planning and/or implementation of STOP. According to other 
arguments the whole ROP was in fact an experiment (there had not been such a program earlier 
in Hungary) (Interview B). Experiments could better be involved in ROPs than in other OPs just 
because the remainders from sectors were placed here and ministries were less interested in 
them so experimentation was more likely to be permitted in the case of ROPs. .Due to the effect 
of the economic crisis, there had been more opportunities for experimentation since 2009 as 
the whole government was engaged in seeking a way out of the crises. Thus the Managing 
Authority of ROP was given more chance to try innovations (Interviews D-E). 
 
Leftoility and proactivity 
It cannot be stated that the National Development Agency and the ROP’s Managing Authority, 
the National Development Agency’s organizational units have been flexible at all or that flexible 
solutions were incorporated in the coordination. On the contrary, they showed all the 
characteristics of a centralized, bureaucratic organization. In addition, it was politicized with 
strong relationships of subordination with the industry and the government.  
Regional Development Agencies were "independent" organizations, but they were directed by 
Regional Development Councils consisting of local and county politicians. As Intermediate 
Bodies they were powerless actors, but there their relationships of subordination were derived 
from Intermediate Bodies contracts and later on controlled directly by ministries. Thus, in terms 
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of procedures, Regional Development Agencies were absolutely inflexible. With the increase of 
centralization (from 2008), the possibility of flexibility within the institutional system decreased 
even further. 
There was no evidence of taking contingencies into account, neither of the consideration of a 
"Plan B" (Interviews B-E). All actors adapted to the Commission’s expectations and higher-level 
political decisions and the National Development Agencies coordinated accordingly. Other 
actors were not involved in shaping the events (external, authorized experts were invited for 
this purpose) (Interviews F,H). They tried to amend the given “A” version within the scope of 
possibilities. They had no impact on the effective structures, the actors involved, and resource 
allocation i.e. they were lacking substantial influence. In fact, each actor followed the events, 
tried to adjust to the new expectations and rules, and no one was proactive or prepared for the 
different scenarios. On the other hand, there was not sufficient time for participants in the 
course of planning and implementation. They were lucky if they could follow the calls for 
applications at all and become familiar with the current rules, etc. (Interviews A-B). 
 
Features of territorial governance 
The effective mobilization of stakeholders disposing of territorial knowledge in the processes 
contributes to the territorial insertion of governance. These actors are able to adequately 
mediate the specific problems, interests and efforts of individual or several groups of 
stakeholders, enhance efficiency during the phase of planning-preparation and foster the 
mobilisation and activity of stakeholders during implementation. The exploitation of territorial 
knowledge has been ambiguous in the Hungarian practice. The involvement of Regional 
Development Agencies has evidently contributed to the territorial insertion of the NSRF, yet the 
“exclusion” of characteristic territorial stakeholders led to the omission of important territorial 
sectoral knowledge from ROPs. 
Institutional learning (SF management, Intermediate Body-type organizations) may largely 
contribute to successful territorial governance, but if this knowledge stands in opposition to the 
expectations of a traditional, centralist political environment, then the external interventions of 
politics may eliminate the positive effects. In Hungary, there was institutional learning at the SF 
institution, but the political interventions that took place during the entire examined period and 
at every level of the institutional system and the processes limited the consolidation and 
retention of the this learning.  
Centralization reduces flexibility and the propensity to take risks. A central, entirely inflexible, 
practically zero risk taking system was established for the absorption of SF funds in the 
Hungarian practice, which was further strengthened by a recentralization trend following the 
most recent governmental change. This has resulted in the extremely rigid structure of the 
Hungarian National Development Agency. 
Through a transparent division of labour within the institution designed for a specific task, 
conflicts surrounding the scope of competencies can be avoided, coordination is simplified, and 
„firm” institutional units are born, which do not hesitate instead of resolving a problem, do not 
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wait for an answer from the top and do not postpone affairs. This was not so in the Hungarian 
case, not even at the highest level of the institutional system, and as we descend down towards 
the Intermediate Bodies, we encounter ever growing uncertainties concerning even their own 
scope of and potential for intervention. Moreover, uncertainties were further increased by the 
constantly changing division of labour, the political exposure and dependence of institutional 
units. 
6. Realising place-based/territorial specificities  
Place-based dimensions of ROPs 
From the point of view the South Transdanubia OP, it is evident (Interviews A-E) that the 
intervention area is the NUTS 2 region accepted by the EUROSTAT. The decision about the 
adoption of a territorial OP was made during the committees’ reconciliations (it was not 
permitted during 2004-06), and it was here that the appropriate scale to be used was 
determined. The main question was whether there would be an individual ROP or only an 
Integrated Regional Operational Programme, or whether the NSRF would adopt any kind of 
place-based approach.  
The Regional Operational Programs and special programs with territorial aspects within the 
NSRFs reflect the place-based approach of European regional and Cohesion Policy. In the CEE 
countries, it is common for separate regional operational programs to be introduced in several 
steps. Since 2004, Hungary and Poland have had an integrated ROP, while Slovakia had no 
regional operational program. From 2007, Slovakia and Romania chose to develop integrated 
regional operational programs, although the Bratislava region is not a cohesion region, so it has 
its own (competitiveness) regional program. On the other hand, Hungary and Poland have 
separate regional operational programs. In Poland, a decentralised SF institution was created, 
while in Hungary, the managing authority of the ROPs has remained the National Development 
Agency (a centralised institution). But, it should also be mentioned, that the territorial scale of 
the Hungarian ROPs (namely the planning regions) lack traditions, regional identity and regional-
scale participants, so this form of place-based development can not be as successful as the 
Polish solution.   
There were some place-based examples in the Hungarian NSRF, for example the so called Pole 
Program, and the urban rehabilitation projects with the required Integrated Urban 
Development Strategies. But these weren’t success stories. In contrast, the European Cultural 
Capital 2010 program is designated as a flagship project in the STOP, of which details are in 
ESPON TANGO Case Study No. 10. 
 
Boundaries as barriers 
The administrative boundaries hinder the planning and implementation of the ROP in several 
respects. During the planning phase, the 3 counties which comprise the region strived to attain 
“harmonisation”. For instance, there were serious negotiations for it in Pécs and Baranya county 
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which received financing for the European Cultural Capital project, then proportionate 
“program parts” were due for the other two counties as well. The regional interests fell through 
the cracks (there was no stakeholder who could have represented them, since the Regional 
Development Council was comprised of county and local self-governmental politicians!), and as 
a result, the possibilities of cooperation were not exploited. Everybody was thinking in terms of 
projects whose realization was located within administrative borders (county, settlement) 
(Interviews F, G, H). That is the reason why no complex programs were realized on the basis of 
the ROP. 
 
Territorial knowledge and effects 
The enhancement of territorial knowledge could be clearly detected in the case of Regional 
Development Agencies. According to an interviewee (A), the role of the South Transdanubian 
RDA was that even though several local, regional stakeholders disposed of regional knowledge 
in their own area and sector, the widest and most complex such knowledge was presumably 
concentrated in the Regional Development Agency. Unfortunately the centralization trend has 
reached them as well, so eventually they have become centrally controlled professional 
organizations albeit disposing of local offices as well.  
The territorial impacts of the program can be demonstrated by the ex-post evaluation. The 
former ex-ante evaluation projected the conservation of the situation of the lagging South 
Transdanubian region and possibly a putting an end to the deterioration; therefore this is how it 
appeared among the OP’s objectives. On top of all this, according to the ex-ante report, this 
impact will be a result of the full NSRF (Interwiev B). What is certain, regardless of territorial 
impacts, is that there will be no individual STOP during the period post-2014, only an integrated 
regional OP for the six cohesion regions, which already forecasts uniform future programs 
totally un-adapted to regional specificities.  
 
Features of territorial governance 
The involvement of administrative regions may strengthen the integration of the regional 
interests into the plans and implementation. Non-administrative regions are artificial 
constructions whose regional embeddedness and identity is weak or lacking, so the ROPs 
designed for them are less capable of enforcing the place-based approach. The Hungarian NUTS 
2 regions are merely planning units with management organs where local-territorial 
municipalities disposed of votes. Therefore, the representation of territorial interests and the 
territorial identity were absent from the Hungarian practice, which hindered the elaboration of 
effective regional programs. 
The preparation and implementation of complex regional development programs instead of 
individual fragmented projects may contribute to a more efficient concentration of resources 
and thereby serves more efficiently the development of the entire region. In contrast, the 
Hungarian practice was lacking and almost rendered impossible the execution of complex 
programs. This was due to divergence during the planning phase, where the state emphasis was 
21 
 
placed on generalization and not on concentration, while the local-territorial self-governments’ 
thinking was focussed within their own administrative borders and there were no stakeholders 
representing regional interests. The Hungarian ROPs therefore lacked an integrated regional 
specificity and were designed in a uniform manner, which made less able to promote the 
enforcement of a place-based approach. 
7. Conclusions  
This case study investigated the practice of territorial governance in four CEE countries from the 
aspect of Structural Fund management. The investigated countries represent unique and 
different responses to the institutional pressure of the Structural Funds. There is a 
harmonization gap in these countries, where the availability of Structural Funds has a significant 
impact on public administration, because the absorption of EU subsidies is one of the most 
important policies and political ambitions. Another common statement is that the partnership 
principle was a great challenge, due to the CEE countries’ traditional, bureaucratic state 
administration system and their limited experiences in the area of partnership. 
Thanks to the local knowledge, the experiences of the Author and the deep interviews 
performed, an in-depth analysis of the Hungarian, and more specifically the South 
Transdanubian Region, was prepared.  
In Hungary, sectoral ministries dominated the management of the preparation and 
implementation of the NSRF. Even though an autonomous institution (National Development 
Agency) - which was entirely independent from the ministries and the public administration - 
had been established by the second programming period, the effective decisions were dictated 
by sectoral ministries even during the implementation phase. The entire institutional system is 
characterized by its political dependence, so the governmental changes (and the changing 
orientations of ministries) brought about a constant transformation in the management system 
of implementation, its functioning, and internal and external communication. A strong Ministry 
responsible for regional development could still have been charged with the representation of 
territorial interests under these circumstances, but no such institution has ever appeared in the 
Hungarian governmental system.  
The involvement of local, regional stakeholders in the elaboration of regional operational 
programs occurred only during the conciliation (commenting periods) of plans and through 
socialization. The preparation of plans was centrally coordinated and basically driven by sectoral 
ambitions. External experts were charged with the preparation of plans to be submitted for 
conciliation, yet no plan variations were ever made. While regional stakeholders involved in the 
conciliation process had a right to comment on these plans, and to modify them, their proposals 
had to be approved by central coordination and the individual sectoral ministries. At the same 
time, there were a small number of effective regional stakeholders participating in the planning 
process, since the stakeholders present tended to represent local sectoral interests. The political 
lobby, which certain local (and parliamentary) representatives could exploit to promote a 
certain affair, gained more emphasis than the reconciliations. Thus, even though the Regional 
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Development Agencies were charged with the organization of regional reconciliations, their 
power remained superficial  the “depth” of the established partnerships was determined at the 
state level.  
The only “quasi” regional stakeholders involved in the implementation were Regional 
Development Agencies, in the form of Intermediate Bodies, however their double relationship 
of subordination questions their identity as territorial stakeholders since they were evidently 
centrally controlled organizations in the SF management system. At the end of the changing 
processes the outcome was centralization and the narrowing scope of action of the Regional 
Development Agencies, and eventually the entire abolition of Regional Development Councils.  
Additionally, the administrative boundaries of counties and settlements meant an obstacle 
during the elaboration and implementation of ROPs. Unfortunately the individual stakeholders 
could not think in terms of complex territorial development, and there were no actors which 
would have been obliged to take this aspect into consideration (Regional Development Councils 
were comprised of county and self-governmental representatives as well and ROPs tended to 
finance mostly their settlement infrastructural projects).  
Approaching the end of the second programming period of the SF, it can be stated that a 
significant knowledge accumulation has occurred at the coordination level. The National 
Development Agency as coordinating body and the Regional Development Agency were 
characterized by institutional learning, while the personal knowledge accumulation was realized 
both within and outside the institutional walls. Regional knowledge accumulation was also 
concentrated in Regional Development Agencies due to their regional conciliatory role and the 
operation of the Regional Development Councils. 
The National Development Agency as coordinating body and Regional Development Agency as 
Intermediate Body were characterized by a totally inflexible operation where they were 
basically a pawn of political powers. Not least, this was due to the fact that, relatively speaking, 
the share of structural funds that were available was so high compared to what was available at 
the state level.  
While the ROP is characterized by a higher risk taking propensity than other components of the 
NSRF, since it is based on a residual principle, the sectors gave free scope of action to the things 
remaining therein. The economic crisis intervened, after which the entire Hungarian economic 
management and SF management were forced to adopt a higher risk-taking attitude. 
It is reasonable to ask whether or not the STOP is a success story in terms of territorial 
governance. The answer must be no, since regional stakeholders were not sufficiently involved 
in the process of its elaboration and implementation. The region could not serve as the scale of 
the STOP, since fragmented projects were realised in individual settlements and counties, a 
complex programming approach was lacking and it was constructed on the basis of the residual 
principle. The OP management was overly centralized, and has in the meantime become even 
more centralized, when in reality international examples, – such as in Poland – demonstrate 
that territorial stakeholders may participate in the SF management in different roles and to a 
greater depth in terms of actual decision making.  
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Definitely positive outcomes are the preparation of a STOP by the 2007-13 period and the 
establishment of an institutional system which has accumulated sufficient knowledge for the 
management of SF. Nevertheless, what prevents the author from closing the case study with a 
positive tone is that these two advantages will undoubtedly disappear from the new 
programming period starting from 2014, therefore it is difficult to talk about long-term 
processes and impacts.  
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